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mAhendrA LAwoti   weStern michigAn univerSity 
inFormAL inStitutionS And excLuSion in 
democrAtic nepAL
Informal institutions, or conventions or codes of behavior, play significant roles in constraining 
human behavior and have important political consequences. Despite much focus on institutionalism, 
the role of informal institutions in political behaviors and outcomes has not been scrutinized 
thoroughly in political science. This paper investigates the contribution of informal institutions to 
the political exclusion of marginalized groups like Dalits, indigenous nationalities, Madhesi, and 
women in democratic Nepal (1990-2002). Scholars have pointed out the role of formal institutions 
like the unitary state and the first past the post electoral method in the political exclusion of these 
groups in Nepal. However, formal institutions do not account for all the exclusion. Not a single 
Dalit was nominated to the cabinet during 1990-2002. This was not due to formal restrictions but 
because of informal norms like the caste system that guide political and social actors’ behavior. 
In this paper I will discuss various ways informal institutions interacted with formal institutions 
during the democratic years to produce the political exclusion of marginalized groups. Specifically, 
I will analyze the role of patriarchy on the exclusion of women, hill nationalism and the exclusion 
of Madhesi, and caste system and Bahunbad and the exclusion of indigenous nationalities and 
Dalit. Analyses of informal institutions are important because even if formal institutions are 
changed, exclusion may still continue because informal institutions persist for long periods.
Despite the pervasiveness of informal institutions 
and their widespread influence, they have largely 
been ignored in the analysis of political behavior 
and outcomes. Since formal institutions have failed 
to adequately explain many political behaviors 
and outcomes, informal institutions have begun to 
attract the attention of political scientists (O’Donnell 
1996; Lauth 2000; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). 
Due to the new nature of the subfield, however, the 
role of informal institutions, in many issues and 
phenomena are yet to be rigorously analyzed.  In this 
paper, I analyze the role of informal institutions in 
the political exclusion of marginalized groups using 
a case study of Nepal during its 1990-02 democratic 
years.1  
This article will engage with, and contribute to 
scholarship in fields of democratization, institutions, 
and Nepal studies. It will contribute to the larger 
1. Nepal’s first experience with democracy was from 
1951-60.  A monarchical regime ruled from 1960-90 after King 
Mahendra dismissed an elected government in 1960.  Democracy 
was restored in 1990 and lasted till October 2002 when King 
Gyanendra dismissed the elected government.  He assumed direct 
leadership of the executive in 2005 but was forced to give up 
power in April 2006 by a popular movement. The monarchy was 
eliminated in 2008 by the newly elected Constituent Assembly.
scholarship on democratization by attempting to 
explain the continuation of political exclusion after 
democratization begins. In the much accepted 
conceptualization of democracy, Dahl (1971)
considers inclusion/participation as one of the two 
dimensions of democratization (the other being 
contestation).  Over the years, more countries 
have democratized and more people have obtained 
franchise rights (Huntington 1991).  However, 
despite expansion of adult enfranchisement, many 
ethnic (national, linguistic, religious, caste, racial) 
groups and women continue to be excluded from 
governance in countries around the world (Gurr 
2000).  Scholars have pointed out that formal 
majoritarian institutions like the first past the post 
(FPTP) electoral system and unitary state structures 
exclude minorities even in democracies (Horowitz 
1994; Lijphart 1977).  However, as the Nepali case 
illustrates below, formal institutions do not explain 
all levels of exclusion in polities. This paper will 
demonstrate that informal institutions influence the 
behavior of political and social actors, thus helping 
to explain the ironic situation of exclusion from 
governance despite formal inclusion at the franchise 
level. 
The 1990 Constitution of Nepal guaranteed 
considerable political rights, civil liberties, and 
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Govinda Neupane (2000) showed the overwhelming 
dominance of the CHHE and Newar in twelve influential 
arenas in 1999: the executive branch, parliament, the 
judiciary, public administration, the security forces, politics 
(i.e. local government and party leadership), leadership of 
academia, industry and commerce, civil society, and cultural 
associations.  Jointly the CHHE and Newar were 36.37 percent 
of the population according to the 2001 census but held 80 
percent of the State’s leadership positions in important arenas 
(e.g. executive, legislature, judiciary, public administration and 
security elite) in 1999.  Their domination included holding 95 
percent of the position in the civil administration, 91 percent 
of the judiciary, 80 percent of positions in the constitutional 
commissions, 72 percent of positions in the cabinet, and a 
68 percent representation in Parliament (both houses).  Even 
the relatively progressive realms like academia, the media, 
and civil society had a negligible presence of marginalized 
groups.  The combined CHHE and Newar dominance in 
the leadership of professional bodies of cultural, academic, 
science-technology, and civil society was 95, 89, 87, and 91 
percent respectively.  Overall, the hill Dalit (7.09 % population) 
had 0.3 percent representation in the twelve sectors while 
the indigenous nationalities (21.85% - not including Newar 
and Tarai indigenous nationalities) and Madhesi (32.33% - 
including Madhesi Dalit and Tarai indigenous nationalities) 
had 7 and 11 percent representation respectively in the twelve 
influential sectors (Neupane 2000).  
Likewise, women were severely underrepresented in the 
cabinet and the Supreme Court had no female justices during 
the 1990s.  The representation of women in the Parliament 
and central committees of major political parties never 
crossed six and ten percent respectively.  Representation in 
the bureaucracy was around seven percent and less than one 
percent at the first class officer level and above (The World 
Bank and DFID 2006).  
The extreme exclusion prevalent in Nepal can be better 
understood with the example of the Dalit.  Except for one 
person in the teaching and academic leadership and four 
members in the Upper House of the Parliament, which is 
relatively powerless, there was no Dalit in any leadership 
position in the remaining ten social, political, and economic 
sectors Neupane (2000) investigated.     
One of the consequences of political exclusion from 
influential decision making bodies was the absence of 
political reform that could address the deep discrimination 
and exclusion faced by marginalized groups.  The absence 
of reforms resulted in the continuation of inequalities and 
exclusion because no new policies meant the continuation 
of the previous policies and discriminatory practices. The 
inequalities and exclusion alienated the marginalized groups 
and exacerbated the armed Maoist conflict initiated in 1996 
that eventually contributed to the breakdown of democracy 
(Lawoti 2009) by contributing to a higher participation of 
some of the marginalized groups.  Likewise, a large number 
of armed Madhesi and indigenous organizations have 
individual freedom. Moreover, it ensured reasonably free and 
fair, periodic elections based on universal adult franchise. 
What then explains the wide and deep level of political 
exclusion that continued in the polity?  I begin by briefly 
reviewing exclusion in democratic Nepal.  
exclUSion in democrAtic nepAl, 1990-2002 
Nepal, which is a country of more than sixty ethnic 
groups, one hundred languages, and half a dozen religions, 
has witnessed exclusion, discrimination, and domination 
of various groups in many spheres including socio-cultural, 
economic and political.  The caste hill Hindu elite (CHHE 
or CHHEM when women are omitted) which consists of the 
“upper” caste Chhetri, Bahun, Thakuri, Sanyasi  and “upper” 
caste Newar of the hills,2 are numerically a minority; yet, 
they overwhelmingly dominate the political, social, and 
economic realms in Nepal.  The indigenous nationalities 
(adibasi janajati), Dalit (the traditional ‘untouchable’ Hindus) 
and Madhesi3 (residents of the plains who share culture with 
North Indian societies) collectively constitute more than two 
thirds of the population but were discriminated against and 
excluded from various socio-political realms.4 
2. The Newar, a multi-caste indigenous group from the Kathmandu 
Valley, make up 5.48 percent of the population and have enjoyed highly 
disproportionate access to socio-economic and political power, mostly by the 
‘upper castes’ within the group.  However, as a group it has faced linguistic 
and other cultural discrimination.
3. CHHE, indigenous nationalities, and Dalit were 30.89, 36.31 
(including Newar) and 14.99 percent of the population respectively in 
2001.  Madhesi are 12.30 percent if only non-Dalit caste Hindus are 
counted and they are 32.29 percent when Tarai indigenous nationalities 
(8.96 %), Tarai Dalit (6.74 %), and Muslim (4.29 %) are counted.  Some 
Tarai Dalit and indigenous nationalities and Muslim prefer to identify as 
Madhesi while others reject the Madhesi identity.  Organizations of Tarai 
indigenous nationalities and Muslims launched street movements in early 
2009 to protest their categorization as Madhesi by the government under the 
pressure of the 2007 and 2008 Madhesi movements.  Within the Madhesi, 
the ‘upper’ caste groups are less excluded from socio-economic and political 
power. 
4. The Dalit, indigenous nationalities, Madhesi and women are not 
homogenous groups and the level of exclusion and discrimination varies 
among different subgroups.  The Dalit are not only divided as hill and Tarai 
Dalit but caste stratification also exists among them.  Likewise, the Madhesi 
are divided into various caste, religious (Hindu, Muslim, and animist), 
linguistic, and ethnic divisions (indigenous versus caste groups). The 
indigenous nationalities are divided along ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
lines while women are divided along caste, ethnic, religious, and regional 
identity. However, members of different categories face some common 
discrimination. For example, the Dalit face the harmful consequences of 
untouchability,  indigenous nationalities suffer linguistic, religious and 
cultural discrimination, the Madhesi endure linguistic discrimination and 
unequal treatment as citizens, and women are confronted with patriarchical 
discrimination (for societal complexity, see Bista 1996; Lawoti 2005; 
Bhattachan 2008; Gurung 1998).
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incompatible with the formal rules…[and] generate outcomes 
that diverge markedly from what is expected from formal 
rules” (ibid: 15). Accommodative informal institutions “create 
incentives to behave in ways that alter the substantive effects 
of formal rules, but without directly violating them.”  They 
“contradict the spirit, but not the letter, of the formal rules” 
(ibid: 15).  
The analysis of informal institutions is important because, 
among other reasons, their affects persist for a long time. 
Some informal rules, in fact, may endure changes in formal 
rules, even though they might slightly change, because 
informal institutions are culturally derived5 and cultural 
norms take a longer time to change (North 1990).  Thus, 
despite the ongoing political changes in Nepal that began in 
April 2006, and the dismantling of some of the exclusionary 
formal institutions (such as Hindu state and discriminatory 
constitutional articles) and the adoption of inclusive formal 
structures in the “new Nepal,” exclusion could decrease but 
may also continue due to the influence of discriminating 
informal institutions.    
political exclusion and institutions in nepal
Scholars have established the role of formal institutions like 
the unitary state, the FPTP electoral method and constitutional 
articles in the continued exclusion of marginalized groups in 
Nepal even after democracy was restored in 1990 (Lawoti 
2005; Khanal 2004; Bhattachan 1999).  The state was 
formally declared Hindu and it treated non-Hindu and 
‘low’ caste Hindus unequally.  The unitary state favored the 
dominant group. As the largest group, the CHHE controlled 
the central government and formulated public policies based 
on its values and interests. The unitary state facilitated the 
imposition of such public policies over other groups around 
the whole country.  The formal institutions, however, 
explain only some part of the political exclusion of the Dalit, 
indigenous nationalities, Madhesi, minority religious groups, 
and women.  For instance, not a single Dalit was nominated 
to the cabinet during the entire 1990-02 democratic years. 
Some of the cabinets had no women while only one or two 
women were included in others. These exclusions and under 
representations were not due to formal restrictions.  Had 
ethnic oriented parties been awarded seats proportionally, 
based on the popular votes they received in the parliamentary 
elections of 1990s, they would have received more seats than 
under the FPTP electoral method; however, the marginalized 
groups would still have been heavily underrepresented in 
the Parliament.  During the 1999 parliamentary election, 
the Sadbhawana Party (Nepal Goodwill Party or NSP) of 
the Madhesi and Nepal Jana Mukti Party (Nepal People’s 
Liberation Party or NJMP) of the indigenous nationalities 
5. Formal institutions may also be culturally derived but not always so. 
Formal institutions that are derived from the local culture could be enduring 
and very effective as they are enforced through state power and societal 
norms.
emerged after democracy was restored in 2006 to fight against 
inequality and exclusion (Pathak and Uprety 2009).
Formal and informal institutions
Institutions significantly affect different aspects of 
politics, including representation and quality of democracy. 
I follow North (1990: 3) in defining institutions, which are 
“the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” 
The new institutionalism that emerged in the eighties in 
political science analyzed the effect of formal institutions 
or “rules and procedures that are created, communicated, 
and enforced through channels that are widely accepted as 
official.”  However, formal institutions do not explain major 
political behaviors such as clientelism, corruption, executive-
legislature relations, etc. (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 5; 
O’Donnell 1996).  The fact that corruption occurs despite 
formal restrictions is ample proof that formal institutions are 
inadequate in explaining some political behaviors.  Hence, 
despite the difficulties in studying informal institutions 
because by definitions they are unwritten and difficult 
to identify and measure, they should be investigated to 
fully understand the causes and consequences of political 
phenomena, especially because they are pervasive while 
formal institutions make only “a small (although very 
important) part of the sum of constraints that shape choice” 
(North 1990: 36).   
Informal institutions are “typically unwritten codes of 
conduct that underlie and supplement formal rules” (North 
1990, 4).  These are “created, communicated, and enforced 
outside of the officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004, 725).  However, to “be considered an informal 
institution, a behavioral regularity must respond to an 
established rule or guideline, the violation of which generates 
some kind of external sanction” (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 
6-7).
Informal institutions interact with formal institutions 
to produce varied outcomes.  Lauth (2000) discusses three 
types of informal institutions based on their interactions 
with formal institutions: complementary, substituting and 
conflicting.  Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 2006) expand Lauth’s 
typology by classifying conflicting informal institutions into 
accommodating and competing subgroups and present four 
types of informal institutions based on outcomes (convergent 
versus divergent) that result upon interaction with formal 
institutions (effective versus ineffective).  Complementary 
informal institutions “enhance the efficiency or effectiveness” 
of effective formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 
13). Substitutive informal institutions achieve what formal 
institutions were designed, but failed, to achieve” (ibid: 
16) because the formal rules are rarely enforced.  The 
outcomes are convergent in both the cases.  The other two 
types of informal institutions produce divergent outcomes. 
Competing informal institutions coexist with ineffective 
formal institutions and “structure incentives in ways that are 
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representation in various sectors but this could have been due 
to temporal factors – women’s representation had been slowly 
increasing for some years (Acharya 1994).    
I have extensively investigated the role of formal 
institutions in this exclusion (Lawoti 2005, 2007, 2008); but, 
as was pointed out earlier, formal institutions do not explain 
all the deep rooted exclusion of marginalized communities.  In 
this article, I argue that informal institutions both separately 
and sometimes as a result of interactions with the formal 
sector, contributed significantly to the exclusion of Dalits, 
Muslims, and others from the political process.  I will discuss 
particular informal institutions that have contributed to the 
exclusion of the Dalit, indigenous nationalities, Madhesi, 
Muslims, and women during Nepal’s democratic interregnum 
of 1990-2002.  
note on methodology And Scope
This paper draws on data obtained during my dissertation 
research in 2000-2001 which explored the role of political 
institutions in the exclusion of various groups in Nepal 
and from subsequent regular field visits.  Initially, I did not 
analyze exclusion from an informal institution framework 
even though I had collected data on stereotyping, the impact 
of caste etc.  The data is based on interviews with leaders, 
common people and activists from the Dalit, indigenous 
nationalities, Madhesi, Muslims, and women as well as the 
Bahun and Chhetri.  It also includes focus group interviews, 
archival research, an extensive literature review, and the 
observations about exclusion in Nepal for a decade, seen from 
a native eye.  
My aim here is to go beyond an ethnographic study of 
particular groups and compare exclusion of various groups 
using informal institutions as my independent variable. By 
doing this, I hope to establish the role of informal institutions 
more firmly than a case study of a single group can. A rich 
ethnographic study peppered by thick description may tell 
us a lot about certain phenomena regarding a group but the 
generalizability of such a study is questionable.  Generalizability 
increases if the same phenomenon is found in more cases 
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).  By looking at the impact 
of informal institutions on the political exclusion of the Dalit, 
indigenous nationalities, Madhesi, and women, I hope to 
firmly establish the contribution of informal institutions to 
this process.   This article does not aim to discuss all forms of 
exclusion faced by different groups, or all aspects of informal 
institutions, nor exclusion of all categories, such as class.  To 
some extent, however, class and identity overlap in Nepal. For 
example, most Dalit are poor.  Even though an investigation 
of class dimension would be interesting, it is beyond the 
confines of this article.  
Furthermore, this article will not analyze how the 
marginalized groups resist domination. This does not 
mean that I assume that the marginalized groups are 
passive recipients of the informal institutions’ impact.  In 
fact, marginalized groups have engaged in covert and overt 
would have received seven and three seats respectively if a 
pure proportional method had been employed instead of five 
and none respectively under the FPTP.  The FPTP electoral 
method contributed in the exclusion but it is not responsible 
for all the exclusion. Informal institutions help to explain the 
unaccounted part of this political exclusion.
Although not articulated as informal institutions, informal 
institutions have been, nonetheless, analyzed as a cause of 
marginalization of various caste and non-caste groups in Nepal. 
A lot of anthropological work that examined the relationship 
among high caste Hindus and others have discussed the role 
of caste structure in the marginalization of the latter groups 
(Guneratne 2002; Caplan 1972; Caplan 1970; Gaige 1975).  A 
number of works (Sharma 1977; Gurung 1988) analyze the 
phenomenon of what Srinivas (1956) called Sanskritization. 
Jones argues that even though the term may indicate upward 
mobilization as suggested by Srinivas, in eastern Nepal it in 
fact harmed the Limbu, who were not part of a caste system 
by incorporating them in the caste systems in a status lower 
than that of the Bahun and Chhetri, even though they were 
autonomous group outside the caste system.  Others have 
discussed how the caste system has excluded various lower 
and non-caste groups and women (Yakharai 1996; Cameron 
1998).  Bista’s classic work on the underdevelopment of Nepal 
also discusses various informal institutions like chakari 
(sycophancy), afno manche (inner circle) etc. that contributed 
to the marginalization of indigenous groups and lower 
castes. However, Bista (as well as the work of others) draws 
mainly on materials from non-democratic periods or they do 
not explicitly analyze the phenomena from an institutional 
framework. These works also do not look at the  effect of 
institutions on democratic politics and their consequences on 
marginalized groups.  Furthermore, works to date on Nepal 
do not look explicitly at how formal and informal institutions 
interacted to produce varied outcomes. 
My assumption is not that informal institutions do not exist 
in democracy. Rather, I am interested in whether institutions, 
and what type of institutions, affect democratic polities and 
in what ways.  One would assume that as different sections 
of the society get more political rights and civil liberties in 
a democratizing polity, their situation would improve as 
the groups begin to assert and use their rights.  Indeed, the 
mobilization of marginalized groups exploded after 1990 
in Nepal.  However, that did not lead to increases in their 
representation in the Parliament, cabinet, bureaucracy, and 
judiciary.  The indigenous nationalities saw a decline in their 
representation in the Parliament and bureaucracy compared 
to the earlier democratic (1959-60) and non-democratic 
(1960-1990) period.  The Madhesi and Muslim representation 
increased slightly in the 1991 parliament but then declined 
in the next two Parliaments, and not a single Dalit was 
nominated to the executive in the entire period.  Likewise, no 
one from the Dalit, Muslim and the non-Newar indigenous 
groups were nominated to the Supreme Court (Lawoti 2008; 
Neupane 2000).  Women did see incremental increases in 
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marginalized groups may have resisted but that the informal 
institutions apparently overcame their resistance to contribute 
to their continued exclusion and domination.  Not analyzing 
their forms of resistance does not weaken my findings.  That 
their exclusion continues despite their resistance supports my 
thesis that informal institutions matter. 
pAtriArchy And exclUSion oF women
Women in Nepal have been legally excluded in political 
and social realms (Tamang 2000; FWLD 2000) but informal 
norms and practices have also played a major role in their 
exclusion.  A good illustration is the low percentage of voting 
by women.  According to the UNDP’s Human Development 
Report (2004) (Annex 2.1, table 7), women’s participation 
was on average less than 20 percent in the local elections 
held in the 1990s.  This occurred despite universal adult 
enfranchisement.  
The argument here is not that women belonging to 
different ethnic groups, castes, regions, religions, and classes 
face the same level of exclusion. The varied impact of the 
social exclusion faced by women hailing from different groups 
due to religious ideology, kinship structure, and access to the 
political elite will be pointed out in the discussion below.  It 
has, in fact, been shown that government affirmative action 
policies have benefitted the ‘high’ caste hill women (Sob 1997; 
Manandhar and Bhattachan 2001; Tamang 1997).  
Social practices and norms at the household, family, and 
society levels are major factors in discrimination against and 
the marginalization of women, and they cannot be eliminated 
by ending legal discrimination alone.  Patriarchy is the root 
informal institution that has disadvantaged women across 
all ethnic/caste groups and classes even though its impact 
is varied across caste, ethnic and religious groups.   I define 
patriarchy, following Mead, Khanam and Nahar (1979), as “a 
set of social relations with a material base that enables men to 
dominate women.”  It may be sustained by aspects of religion, 
kinship, political systems, social structures, and men’s 
control over property (land, house etc.), income and women’s 
labor.  Patriarchy puts women in a dominated position within 
households, extended family and society, and constrains 
them from participating in politics, economic activities and 
society in general.  
religious traditions, patriarchy, and exclusion
In Nepal, Hindu and Muslim religions in particular have 
enhanced and sustained patriarchy while women belonging 
to indigenous groups that either do not follow the major 
religious traditions or are less exposed to them are less likely 
to be impacted.  Likewise, the hold of patriarchy is weaker 
on the ‘lower’ caste Dalit because they have less access to 
land and the other resources through which patriarchy is 
often mediated, and less attachment to the concept of purity 
(Cameron 1998).  On the other hand, patriarchy’s hold on 
‘high’ caste women is very strong: “from crib to cremation, a 
woman’s life in Hindu culture is circumscribed, regimented, 
resistance and rebellions. Academics have analyzed a few 
past overt resistance by ethnic groups (Lecomte-Tilouine 
2003; Gaenszle 2009),  religious sects (Uprety 1992) and 
women (Aziz 1993).  Other instances of resistance have 
been mentioned (Gurung 2004; Caplan 1970; Jones 1976; 
Lawoti 2007; Regmi 1995; Neupane 2000) but have not been 
described and analyzed in detail.  Likewise, as mentioned 
earlier, the post 1990 years saw large scale mobilizations of 
people along lines of identity (Lawoti 2007, 2005; Gellner, 
Pfaff-Czarnecka, and Whelpton 1997; Bhattachan 2000), 
including gender and class, e.g. the Maoist rebellion (see Hutt 
2004; Lawoti and Pahari 2009). 
Hangen (2005; 2007) has pointed out how non-Hindu 
Gurungs have boycotted the Hindu festival of Dashain as a 
protest and formed their own ethnic parties to fight against 
Hindu domination and exclusionary practices. Holmberg 
(2000) has shown that the Tamang engaged in the derision of 
the ruling elite during their religious rituals in an attempt to 
retain group autonomy and symbolic power. Maharjan (2007) 
discusses participation in Theravada Buddhism as a way of 
protest by Newars in the Kathmandu valley.  Additionally, 
Guneratne (2002) shows how different language speaking 
communities created a Tharu identity to encompass a larger 
population in their struggle against the state dominated by 
hill Hindus.
Overt direct and indirect opposition, however, are not the 
only forms of resistance.  As Scott (1985; 1989) has amply 
demonstrated, common people engage in everyday resistance 
to subvert domination. They lie about things if they cannot 
openly rebel, remain non-committal, arrive late, make 
excuses, engage in malicious gossips about powerful people, 
embrace passive noncompliance, evade and deceive, drag 
their feet, encroach upon lands controlled by the local elite 
and the state, pilfer, commit sabotage and arson, and desert 
the military during war.  Agarwal (1994, chapter 9) discusses 
a variety of ways women resist, bargain for or protect their 
interests including hiding their income and cash in multiple 
places to prevent husbands from discovering and spending 
all their savings, acting as if spirits have possessed them to 
make demands and complaints, withholding sex, telling 
jokes and singing songs to express dissatisfaction and make 
fun of men, threatening to return to their natal home, playing 
off male affines and consanguines against each other, refusing 
to speak, and eating good food when males are not around. 
One can plausibly argue that marginalized groups in Nepal 
are also engaged in various forms of covert resistance.
These overt, covert and indirect forms of resistance are 
all very interesting activities and they have contributed in 
protecting the rights of marginalized groups. However, my 
aim is not to explicate how such overt and covert resistance 
contributed to the protection of the interests of these groups, 
including in their political representation. My aim instead is 
to see how and in what ways informal institutions may have 
contributed to the political exclusion of various marginalized 
groups.  The assumption I make in this article is that 
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Even when women are awarded equal inheritance rights they 
might have to sell off the land or may be obligated to give it to 
brothers to keep the option of returning to their natal home 
open in case of marital problems.  Even if women keep land 
after marriage, husbands often become the de facto owners of 
the properties (Agarwal 1994).
control over resources
Male control over the resource base also hinders women’s 
independence, development and subsequent participation in 
the public sphere.  Land, houses, and livestock are the most 
valuable form of property to the large rural farming population 
in Nepal.  They are often held in the name of male family 
members.  According to the World Bank and DFID (2006: 
24), “[o]nly about 11 percent of households reported any land 
in female legal ownership; six percent reported that women 
had ‘some’ ownership of a house…Surprisingly, only seven 
percent reported female ownership of livestock, even though 
for many groups livestock rearing is traditionally a female 
task.” This skewed property ownership is due to both formal 
and informal norms.  Nepal’s discriminatory inheritance laws 
have been reformed to some extent6 but even the new laws 
did not change the unequal property holdings.  Despite the 
reforms, the informal norms of preferring sons continue to 
favor men in the distribution of parental and family resources. 
The lack of resources makes women dependent upon men, 
materially and psychologically.  If women want to engage in 
business and want to take out loans, they will have to ask 
male relatives to put property up as collateral.7  Without 
financial independence, it is generally difficult to participate 
and succeed in politics.   
male dominated political System
The political system which is heavily dominated 
by men has contributed to creating a vicious circle 
of exclusion. First, it discourages women from 
participating in politics and undermines their role in 
the formulation of socio-economic policies (Lama 1997; 
Manandhar and Bhattachan 2001).  Second, it has deprived 
women of role models.  Third, women may also be constrained 
in politics because society - and men particularly - may not 
treat such women with respect and dignity.  They may be 
given denigrating names for interacting with non-family 
men.  In competitive politics, women are more vulnerable 
to oppositional attacks and a significant part of the society 
may not vote for them because they will be seen as engaging 
in activities where women are ‘not supposed to be.’  Fourth, 
the “men’s club” may also not share all information and 
6. Unmarried daughters are entitled equal inheritance under the 
reforms while earlier only sons were entitled.
7. Observations from villages in East Nepal and Kathmandu. however, 
sometimes male relatives borrow gold and other jewelry from women to put 
up as collateral to take out loans from banks or money lenders.  Rich women 
thus may have some leverage.
exploited, caged, consumed and destroyed by religion-
poisoned society” (Mishra 1997: 347).  Religious traditions 
and beliefs, such as sons necessary to perform after-death-
rituals for dead persons, have made boys more important than 
girls.  The treatment of women as objects of purity in major 
religious traditions constrains their free public movement to 
supposedly ‘protect’ their purity.  One such practice secludes 
women and undermines their role in the public sphere. 
During the monthly menstruation period women, especially 
in the ‘high’ caste, are considered to be impure and have to 
spend the period in isolation to avoid defiling others through 
contact.  Such practices constrain women’s independence and 
may undermine their dignity.  
The notion that women do not belong in the public sphere, 
another form of seclusion also undergrided by religious 
traditions, is another important patriarchal norm contributing 
to the exclusion of women.  The norm stipulates that women’s 
place is in the private sphere of bearing and raising children, 
taking care of the household and families, etc. whereas the 
public sphere like politics, market activities, and civil society 
belong to the men (Okin 1991; Young 1990).  Women are 
disadvantaged by being relegated to the private sphere.  First, 
household work is often not considered as ‘real’ work, not 
assessed accordingly, and is unpaid.  Second, the work takes 
so much time that it makes women ‘poor’ with regard to time. 
Studies found that women could not participate in training 
opportunities and meetings because of too many household 
responsibilities (Cornwell 2003; The World Bank and DFID 
2006, 36).  The notion of public versus private is less common 
however among the indigenous nationalities, whose women 
are active in economic and other activities beyond the 
household (Acharya 2000).  
Kinship Structure
Kinship structures reinforce patriarchy and exclusion 
by increasing vulnerability of women and making them 
dependent upon men, for example to their father when they 
are young, their husband during adult life and their sons 
in old age.  The practice of patrilocal marriage among most 
communities in Nepal removes women from their family 
and village of birth and attenuates women’s relationship to 
the natal family through distance and norms that restricts 
frequent visit to natal home.  Among other things, it increases 
their vulnerability because they have to start life in a new 
place and build networks all over again.  In competitive 
politics, it puts them at a disadvantage with males who have 
established networks in areas where they have always lived 
(Agarwal 1994).  Second, as women move away and may not 
be around in old age to look after them, many parents invest 
more in sons (e.g. education, food).  Thus, women in general 
may not acquire skills and capabilities necessary to become 
competitive in the economy, the society and politics. 
Furthermore, unequal land holdings between men and 
women (see next section) is also facilitated by the practice 
of women moving away from the birth home after marriage. 
23 HIMALAYA  XXVIII (1-2) 2008 iNFormAl iNStitutioNS / lAWoti
groups to some extent but the discussion that follows will 
make it clear that each phenomenon affected one particular 
group more than it does others.
The socio-cultural-political hegemony based on the 
CHHE value-influenced caste system, and the reproduction of 
an unequal society through it, has been labeled as Bahunism 
by the father of Nepali anthropology Dor Bahadur Bista 
(1991).  Many find the formulation helpful to explain Nepal’s 
social inequality and underdevelopment (Bhattachan 1999; 
Yakharai 1996; Biswakorma 2003; Metz 1996; Sharma 1991; 
Neupane 2000) while some members from the dominant 
group have rejected the concept and term outright.9  Dahal 
(1990) and Pahari (1992) have pilloried the book showing 
“contradictions” and suggesting a failure to analyze alternative 
hypotheses and establish cause and effect.  However, the 
criticisms have been criticized for being “one sided, negative 
statements,” attempts at disproving generalizations by showing 
exceptions, missing the forest for the trees, and criticizing an 
inductive and ethnographic study whose aim was not to test 
hypotheses and establish cause and effect (Bennett 1992: 4-5). 
Many find the concepts useful and have expanded them to 
explain underdevelopment and the exclusion of marginalized 
groups (Kamata 1999; Macfarlane 2001; Neupane 2000). 
Alan Macfarlane (1994, 115), a prominent anthropologist, 
finds Bista’s book Fatalism and Development so insightful 
that he compares it with De Tocqueville’s Ancien Regime, 
Weber’s Protestant Ethic, and Taine’s Notes upon England.  If 
Bahunism is understood as an imposition of one’s culture and 
values on others through domination over the state and the 
legitimizing of the superior position of certain groups based 
on ascription, then the concept describes a powerful informal 
institution that has helped to perpetuate social inequality 
and hegemonic domination in Nepal (Neupane 2000; Lawoti 
2005; Malla 1992).10  The wide adoption of the concept by 
9.  Bahunism could become a racist epithet if applied to all Bahuns.  
There is a widespread stereotype that Bahuns are crafty, cunning and 
conspiring.  Like any stereotype, this is not true with regard to all Bahuns 
but is based on the devious behaviors of some individuals, which has 
been recorded by anthropologists (Bista 1991; Caplan 1970; Caplan 1972; 
Guneratne 2002), including a Bahun (Dahal 2036 v.s.).  Such individuals 
have, in fact, harmed decent Bahuns indirectly by helping to create and 
perpetuate stereotypes.  Bahuns have also been directly harmed by cunning 
Bahuns but probably less than individuals from other groups because the 
caste system and social networks protect them to some extent. 
10. The term Bahunism does not strictly reflect the caste system but 
rather signifies power enjoyed by Bahun (hill Brahmin) and Thakuri and 
their use of that power to reformulate the caste system to place them in 
superior positions and to legitimize those positions based on ascription.  
Caste laws of 1854 in Nepal rendered Bahuns and Thakuris higher than the 
Tarai Brahmin, who follow the Hindu rituals of purity and vegetarianism 
more rigorously and who are traditionally ranked higher (see Hofer 2004, 
figure 2, p.9). The Thakuri is listed below the Upadhaya Bhraman but higher 
than the Jaisi Brahman, Chetri, Newar Braman, Indian Brahmin, ascetic sects, 
lower Jaisi and various Newar castes in the tagadhari, the highest category.  
resources with women.  Men socialize among themselves 
and this deprives women from getting tips and support that 
informal networks provide.  Even if they are let into the inner 
circles it may be due to ‘enlightened’ leader(s) and this may 
make women dependent on such patron.  Fifth, women 
activists have said that many women do not engage in politics 
because it’s guided by masculine values of fierce competition 
that could involve physical altercations (Lama 1997), while 
women in some ethnic groups are often socialized into being 
submissive from an early age. Finally, as women are perceived 
as uncompetitive by male political leaders, it lessens their 
chances of being recruited for competitive politics. 
It could be argued that a reason for the low participation of 
women may be their lack of education, skills, and capabilities. 
Even so, this absence is due to patriarchy that favors sons 
over girls in education, opportunities, food, and other 
arenas.  Infant and under-five mortality rates for girls have 
been persistently higher than for boys in Nepal (The World 
Bank and DFID 2006: 26).8  On the other hand, studies from 
rich but conservative societies have shown that social norms 
restrict even educated women.  For example, women in Middle 
Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia are highly educated 
but are not allowed to work in many professions (Morrison 
and Jutting 2005).  Nepal does not have similar levels of 
restrictions but it is naive to assume that educated women, 
as well as women from the Dalit, indigenous nationalities 
and Madhesi groups more generally, do not face problems in 
politics and job markets. 
Patriarchy operates in two ways to reproduce and 
reinforce exclusion of women.  First, patriarchal norms (an 
informal institution), such as those that consider women to 
be subordinate, competes with ineffective formal institutions 
(gender equality laws) and produces divergent outcomes of 
female exclusion. Secondly, patriarchal norms that support 
the discriminating formal institutions, such as unequal 
inheritance law, are complementary informal institutions. 
They reinforce exclusionary formal institutions to entrench 
exclusion.
hill hindU cASte SyStem And exclUSion
While patriarchy contributes to the pervasive exclusion 
of women, the hill Hindu ‘upper’ caste system and its values 
contribute to the widespread exclusion of non-CHHE groups. 
By definition the hierarchical caste system privileges some 
groups while discriminating against others. The Nepali 
caste system excludes the Dalit through the practice of 
“untouchability,” indigenous nationalities by labeling them as 
‘lower’ caste and by not recognizing their culture and identity, 
and the Madhesi by lowering their caste ranks compared to 
co-hill castes (Dastider 1995; Gaige 1975; Yadav 1997; Lawoti 
2005; Biswakorma 2003; Kisan 2005).  Untouchability, 
cultural domination, and exclusionary nationalism affect all 
8. Under-five Mortality Rate per thousand was 91.2 for boys and 112.4 
for girls in 2001.
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of other groups.  Yakharai (1996) describes an incident where 
a Bahun minister and secretary promoted junior civil servants 
of their caste over other senior and competent bureaucrats 
by giving their caste protégés full points in interviews to 
overcome other bureaucrats’ higher marks in other arenas of 
evaluation such as written tests and service length.
Third, with CHHE domination in politics, administration 
and other spheres, marginalized groups faced differential 
consequences in their lives.  For example, nearly 60 percent 
of the prisoners in three Kathmandu jails were Dalit and 
indigenous nationalities. The disproportionate imprisonment 
of the groups was largely because ‘low’ caste people were 
victimized by the ‘high’ caste administration while the ‘high’ 
caste were either not similarly effected or were able to use 
caste network and influence in the system so as not to get 
imprisoned or get out of jail quickly (Nepal 2006).  Such 
differential consequences due to the unfavorable conditions 
are prevalent in other spheres. 
Marriage (endogamous), socialization, religious rituals, 
family and other kinship networks tie the ‘high’ caste group 
together and contribute to their social mobility because 
powerful political leaders and administrators hail from the 
group.  Such networks provide opportunities for mobility to 
cadres and socio-political insurance to leaders by facilitating 
monitoring of ‘clients’ or people they have rewarded, making 
them effective institutions of discrimination and exclusion. 
Chandra (2007) argues that monitoring is easier along ethnic 
lines because ethnic identity makes available more easily 
information necessary for monitoring.  If people betray their 
patrons, the dissenters could face consequences from social, 
family, and caste associations and networks.  
The misunderstanding, discomfort, and conflict due 
to cultural differences, on the other hand, have harmed 
members of the marginalized groups.  For instance, some 
Madhesi and indigenous nationalities’ Parliament members 
from CPN-UML (Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist 
Leninist) were censured for raising issues pertaining to their 
scholars and marginalized groups is resisted by many male 
Bahuns.11 This validates the claim that caste is an important 
factor by demonstrating that resistance is based on caste 
identity.
This caste system, based on the values of dominant hill 
Hindu groups, has helped to reproduce severe political 
exclusion of other ethnic groups and women, which continued 
even during the democratic years.  Bahuns, in particular, 
increased their dominance in politics after 1990 while most 
other groups’ representation, including that of the Chhetri and 
Newar, the other two dominant groups, declined.  There is no 
denying that high educational attainment contributed to the 
social mobility of Bahuns, but better educational attainment 
itself was the result of a more or less historic monopoly 
over education and contemporary policies that privileged 
Bahuns, who received instruction in their native language as 
well as free education in Sanskrit.  Educational attainment 
alone, however, does not explain the group’s hegemony.  If 
educational attainment alone were a factor, then the Newar 
should have improved their performance as well because in 
addition to being better off socio-economically, which also 
fosters mobility, their educational attainment is high.    
Hill casteism prevalent in the polity works to advantage 
the hill ‘high’ caste and disadvantage ‘low’ castes and others in 
several ways.  First, the system marginalizes ‘lower’ castes and 
others and renders them uncompetitive.  For example, lower 
education levels among marginalized groups due to historic 
and contemporary policy bias (e.g. education in a language 
other than their mother tongue) made the marginalized 
groups less competitive (Yadav 1992; Ragsdale 1989).  
Second, caste based nepotism and favoritism, which guides 
politics and other spheres, advantaged the hill ‘high’ caste 
groups in politics.  Supreme leaders often promote caste 
loyalists.  Generally, they feel secure and comfortable with 
family and caste members who share a similar worldview, 
language, culture and religion and are socially permitted 
to enter their households, participate in their rituals, etc.12 
Empirical analysis of the parliament trends supports this 
thesis.  During the Panchayat period, when the king was 
supreme, the king’s caste group (Thakuris) and Chhetris 
dominated the Parliament overwhelmingly, holding 37.2 
percent of the seats, while Bahuns held only 20 percent.  On 
the other hand, during 1990-02, when the Bahuns dominated 
the political party leadership, they overwhelmingly dominated 
the Parliament with 39 percent of seats while the Chhetris, 
who are around 50 percent more than Bahuns in terms of the 
national population, declined to 19.6 percent (Lawoti 2008). 
Caste based nepotism has often sidelined competent persons 
11. I have found that rejection is more widespread among many 
“educated” male Bahuns and some Chhetris active in online Nepali forums 
dedicated to “democracy,” “environment” etc.
12. Traditionally the Dalit are often not allowed to enter households 
while all ‘lower’ castes are generally barred from entering the kitchens and 
participating in ‘high’ caste rituals.
Figure 1: Caste and Political Representation
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respective groups in the party forum.  Such punishment and 
suspicion by top CHHEM leaders undermined the careers of 
the marginalized group leaders.  Some left the parties that 
they had invested considerable time and energy in.13  The 
exit by leaders, ironically, further reduced the presence of 
marginalized groups in major political parties.    
The discussion of influence of hill based caste systems in 
politics does not mean that it is the only factor that influences 
political behavior and outcomes.  Individual ability, and 
control or influence over resources also affects politics. 
Members of ‘lower’ caste groups could control these resources 
as well, though it is rare in reality. However when everything 
else is constant, the hill Hindu-value influenced caste system 
prevalent in the society helps in the upward mobility of ‘higher’ 
hill caste groups in politics and society while constraining 
members belonging to other groups.  The next sections will 
discuss specific informal institutions that contributed to the 
exclusion of different marginalized groups.
Untouchability and the exclusion of the dalit
Even though caste discrimination and untouchability was 
legally ended and made discrimination on those grounds a 
punishable crime in the 1990 Constitution, the Dalit continue 
to bear the brunt of the caste system due to untouchability, 
which most Dalit face almost every day.  The study on 
Measuring Empowerment and Social Inclusion conducted by 
the World Bank and the DFID (2006: 35) provides a good 
sense of its prevalence: “When asked if she had entered the 
homes of high caste people in her village, a Dalit woman in 
Tanahun district laughed, ‘Not once! I’ve watched functions 
of high-caste families from outside their windows.’”    
Dalits are still prohibited to enter many temples, use 
public water sources, and are forced to carry out traditional 
occupations, such as disposing of dead animals.  In 2005, 
several Dalits were fined for entering temples in Saptari 
district and those who could not pay were expelled from the 
district (The World Bank and DFID 2006: 41), while in Siraha 
district Dalits were forced to remove carcasses of dead animals 
(Uprety, Rai, and Sedhain 2005).  The data on untouchability/
caste discrimination collected by the Informal Service Center 
(INSEC) shows that the practice of untouchability has gone 
unabated (figure 2).  The data represents events that produced 
counter resistance related to the practice of untouchability. 
It clearly demonstrates that incidents of untouchability that 
have come to the attention of human rights groups have not 
declined (INSEC 2008).14
Leaders of the ‘high’ caste groups have not treated Dalits 
as political equals.  The non-nomination of Dalits for public 
13. Interviews, Kathmandu, summer 2007.
14. The low number of reported cases in the late nineties is probably 
due to INSEC’s inexperience in collecting data on untouchability.  INSEC 
officials told me in the summer of 2008 that they began to collect data on 
issues they felt important as they gained more experience in human rights 
issues, and developed data collection methods on a trial and error basis.  
Figure 2: Reported Caste-based Discrimination
offices and the absence of progressive programs by major 
political parties to end untouchability and promote inclusion 
demonstrate this ambivalent attitude.  As noted above, not 
a single Dalit was made a minister during the 1990-02 
democratic period.  Likewise, only one Dalit was elected in 
the three parliamentary elections (one out of a total of 615 
possible seats).15
Educated, ‘high’ caste Nepalis often argue that 
untouchability exists only in rural areas among the illiterate. 
This is far from the truth.  First, news of occasional public 
feasts among Dalit and non-Dalit as campaigns against 
untouchability in some urban areas demonstrates that the 
practice is still prevalent enough for some progressive groups 
to organize such events and become newsworthy.  It is true 
that untouchability has been reduced in urban areas but its 
remnants still affect a large number of people, especially 
women.  An ethnographic study in the Kathmandu Valley in 
2006 found that Dalit women could collect water from public 
wells only after ‘high’ caste women to avoid ‘defilement’ of 
water collected by the ‘high’ caste.  A social boycott of a Dalit 
woman, who broke the norms and complained about the 
practice of untouchability to the authorities shows that the 
practice is still socially enforced with severe consequences 
even in urban areas.  A fine of thousand rupees was levied by 
the community to those who broke the boycott, due to which 
the Dalit woman lost her tailoring business (Kharel 2007). 
Dalits, including activists, have told me that they often 
have to pretend to be a Bahun or Chhetri to rent apartments in 
Kathmandu and have been asked to vacate office spaces after 
the owners found out that they were Dalit. Folmar (2007) has 
15. This does not, however, mean that the situation of Dalits has not 
improved. Caplan (1972) had noticed in 1969 itself that Dalits had begun 
to oppose Bahuns in a West Nepal village by supporting another faction 
led by a lower ranked Jaisi Bahun, who they perceived as sympathetic, 
after universal franchise was introduced in village elections. The decrease 
in economic dependence of the Sarki (Cobblers) on the Bahuns and 
demographic status of Sarki who were nearly half of the village also 
facilitated the process.  My argument is that Dalits have not become equal 
citizens and still face major exclusion and discrimination.   
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dimensions can be assessed by analyzing stereotypes and 
societal attitudes that denigrate the marginalized groups, 
their values, culture, and lifestyles.  Stereotyping is prevalent 
in Nepali society toward both the dominated and dominant 
groups but it hurts the dominated groups more because they 
are not able to resist the impact of the demeaning portrayals. 
Patriarchy, the caste system, and hill nationalism have 
generated and reproduced stereotypes about the marginalized 
groups (Neupane 2000; Thapa-Magar 2000; Acharya 1994; 
Yadav 1997).  Demeaning stereotyping is probably more 
varied and severe towards indigenous groups because they are 
more different than the dominant group in terms of culture, 
language, religion, and physical appearance.16  
Stereotyping portrays the marginalized group as deviant 
because the groups do not possess the characteristics of the 
dominant groups that have been established as normal/
universal (Young 1990).  Hence, they are often considered 
dumb, incompetent, lazy, and problematic, among other 
things.  In Nepal, stereotyping occurs at a number of levels. 
Songs, proverbs, morals and folklores project the marginalized 
communities negatively and the dominant group in superior 
terms (Thapa-Magar 2000).  For instance, popular songs 
unabashedly use derogative words about marginalized 
groups such as dalli magarni (round faced Magar belle) and 
nepti (stub-nosed).17  The people who do not see any problem 
with such songs react strongly if words like chucchi bahuni 
(pointed nosed Bahuni) are used.18  Innumerable instances 
of folklore and moral values depict indigenous nationalities, 
women and Dalit as lazy, dirty, dumb, or undependable 
(Mohsin et al. 2003; Neupane 2000).19  The demeaning 
stereotypes are prevalent and they have been internalized 
by the oppressed group members in many instances.  For 
instance, many Dalit and indigenous nationalities consider 
that their ‘bad’ habits, such as alcohol consumption, are the 
cause of their underdevelopment.  That people of the same 
stock with similar consumption habits have reached political 
and economic prominence and performed better than the 
CHHEM across the border in Sikkim and Darjeeling, show 
the falsity of such views (Lawoti 2005).
People can develop and grow well in their own cultural 
environment whereas discriminatory social attitudes 
16. I do not discuss the Muslims even though the group is facing 
similar cultural problems because of limited literature on the problems 
facing the group.
17. A song - “maya kasle diyo nepti lai lightarra” (who gave a lighter to 
the stub-nosed belle).
18. Derogative portrayals are found in the popular Khas-Nepali 
literature as well.  Pradeep Thapa-Magar (2000: 45-50) discusses a number 
of protests by indigenous nationalities activists over demeaning portrayals of 
the groups in the literary works like Silanyas (Bhimniddhi Tiwari), Dharanko 
Ukali Orali (Madhav Prasad Pokhrel) and Sumnimma (B.P. Koirala).  
19. The extent of derogatory proverbs used against the Dalit is such 
that they are almost always presented as examples describing human frailties 
and possessing negative habits and attributes.  
argued that presenting false identities as coping strategies at 
the individual level has undermined empowerment of the 
community because such people may hesitate to participate 
inpublic actions for fear of being found out. 
Second, Dalit activists claim that even many educated 
individuals, who self-project as liberals and progressives, 
still follow the practice of restricted commensality.  Some 
often claim helplessness when family members practice such 
rituals and defend it as their family’s ‘human rights’ but do 
not seem to notice glaring human rights violations by such 
practices.  Third, untouchability is problematic even if it 
occurs only in rural areas.  86 percent of Nepal’s people live 
in rural areas.  A large number of people are associated with 
the oppressive practice—as victims, active oppressors, or 
passive participants.   
Finally, untouchability deprives Dalits of equal economic 
and other opportunities.  Many jobs, professions and business 
opportunities (such as opening tea stalls and selling milk) 
available for enterprising rural people are not viable options 
for Dalits because many members of the society may not buy 
edible goods from them.  Meanwhile, with penetration of the 
market and the availability of cheaper readymade clothes, 
shoes and metal farming implements, traditional sources 
of income of the Dalit have been undermined (Blaikie, 
Cameron, and Seddon 1980).  Such constraints undermine 
the development and social mobility of Dalits and contribute 
to their exclusion from social and public life.  A group whose 
members face caste discrimination everyday and who are 
deprived economically cannot be expected to be competitive 
in politics and other realms.  
This discussion has shown that the social practice of 
untouchability contributes to exclude the Dalit directly 
as well as indirectly by marginalizing them and making 
them uncompetitive.  The prevalence of untouchability 
despite a constitutional ban shows that informal institutions 
(untouchability) competed with ineffective formal institutions 
(a Constitutional ban) to produce a divergent outcome of 
continued widespread untouchability.  
ethnic/national domination and the exclusion of 
indigenous nationalities
The indigenous nationalities were marginalized by the 
dominant CHHEM societal norms that denigrated their 
language, culture, religion, and lifestyles.  The dominant 
group considered the indigenous nationalities as ‘low’ caste, 
even though they were not part of the caste system.  The 
assimilation policy and processes, vigorously promoted 
under the guise of modernization and development during 
the Panchayat era, projected dominant ethnic values, 
worldviews, language, religion, culture and tradition as 
Nepali and resulted in other groups and their attributes being 
perceived as less Nepali and inferior.  For example, people 
who did not either know Khas-Nepali or lacked mastery over 
it were often considered incompetent.       
Domination along national/ethnic and religious 
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citizenship.20  The Madhesi became victims because the hill 
dominated administration would often deny citizenship to the 
Madhesi on the grounds that they were Indians.  Even when 
the Madhesi had all necessary documents, they faced long 
delays in acquiring citizenship (Burkert 1997).  The lack of 
citizenship certificates, which were necessary for government 
jobs, purchasing property and standing for public offices, 
deprived the Madhesi of fundamental rights.
The consequence of the dominant strata’s discriminatory 
attitude towards the Madhesi can be demonstrated more 
clearly if access to the state by similar caste and ethnic groups 
from the hill and Tarai communities are compared.  If one 
compares the Bahun (Hill Brahmin) and Tarai Brahmin, the 
former has greater access to positions in the state.  Similarly, 
the hill Chhetri, indigenous nationalities, and the Dalit 
enjoyed more access to the state than the Tarai Chhetri 
(Thakur), indigenous nationalities, and the Dalit (table 2). 
For instance, during the 1990s, not a single Tarai Dalit was 
nominated to the powerless Upper House, which was one 
agency where major political parties and the king sometimes 
appointed one or two Dalits.  
The source of discrimination and exclusion of the 
Madhesi is the hill nationalism that did not recognize the 
Madhesi as equal members of the Nepali nation-state.  This 
is akin to what Gramsci (1971: 195) had observed: “the State 
renders the ruling group “homogeneous”, and tends to create 
a social conformism which is useful to the ruling group’s line 
of development.”  The Nepali nation and nationalism was 
20. An article of the 1990 constitution restricted citizenship to 
only those whose father had a certificate.  As many Madhesi were denied 
citizenship certificates when it was distributed, their offspring were also 
subsequently denied.  These Nepalis were given citizenship certificates in 
2007.
and practices constrain the growth and development of 
different socio-cultural groups, debase cultures by negative 
portrayal, and contribute to producing low self-esteem 
among members of such groups (Kymlicka 1995).  The 
indigenous nationalities and others in Nepal were hindered 
in social mobility and constrained in their development due 
to discrimination against their culture, values, and traditions. 
They were disadvantaged in competition with members of the 
dominant groups in the CHHE biased cultural environment, 
perpetuating their exclusion, including in politics. 
The pervasive stereotyping, non-recognition of the culture 
of marginalized groups and their treatment as ‘low caste’ 
demonstrates the role of competing informal institutions in 
the exclusion of such groups in a constitutionally declared 
‘multi-ethnic’ Nepal (see table 1).  On the other hand, non-
recognition of religion of the indigenous nationalities (e.g. 
Kirati) by the dominant group complemented the declaration 
of the state as Hindu in the 1990 Constitution and helped to 
produce convergent outcomes.
hill nationalism and the exclusion of madhesi 
The exclusion of the Madhesi is unusual because the 
Tarai is the most fertile region, which should have favored 
the Madhesi in competitive socio-political spheres - in many 
parts of the world people of the fertile plains perform better 
politically and economically.  The most blatant discrimination 
against the Madhesi was in the citizenship realm.  A 
government commission calculated that 3.4 million Nepali 
sixteen year olds and older—the majority of them Madhesi 
—were without citizenship certificates in mid-1990s.  This 
discrimination in citizenship was not solely due to formal 
laws that barred the Madhesi specifically from acquiring 
Outcomes/
Effectiveness
Effective Informal Institutions Ineffective Formal Institutions
C
on
ve
rg
en
t
Complementary
Unequal gender based inheritance laws & 
patriarchaical practices;
Denial of citizenship to the Madhesi, and hill 
nationalism;
Non-recognition of the Kirati religion in 1991 
census
Substitutive
Customary traditions that empower ethnic/
national groups in ‘multiethnic’ (as declared by 
the Constitution) society
D
iv
er
ge
nt
Accommodating Competing
Exclusion of women, the Madhesi, indigenous, 
& the Dalit in public offices (negative);
Prevalence of untouchability (negative);
Customary traditions & practices that promote 
identity despite formal discouragement 
(positive)
Framework adapted from Helmek and Levitsky (2006:14)
Table 1: Variants of Informal Institutions, 1990-02
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defined along the traditions and identity of the hill people - it 
was a regional-ethnic nationalism paraded as universal. The 
exclusionary nationalism was perpetuated through informal 
attitudes of the hill residents and with support from formal 
institutions.  The rituals and traditions that were promoted 
to foster a sense of Nepali identity were mostly hill based. 
Even though the Madhesi are Hindus, the hill controlled 
state defined the Hinduism of the state along hill cultural 
lines, such as granting most public holidays on hill Hindu 
festivals (Mohsin et al. 2003).
Hill nationalism is an informal institution because 
the laws of the land do not formally declare Nepalis to be 
exclusively the hill people.  The hill nationalists consider 
the Madhesi as either Indians or recent migrants from 
India and question their loyalty to the nation-state. These 
informal norms were reinforced in earlier periods by formal 
laws.  For instance, as mentioned earlier, though Brahmins 
occupy the top positions in the Hindu caste hierarchy, the 
1854 civil code put the Thakuri (Hill Kshatriya) above the 
Tarai Brahmin (Hofer 2004).  This demonstrates that hill 
nationalism was so strong that it even overrode the ritual 
hierarchy prescribed by Hindu tradition.
The Madhesi were not recognized as a genuine group 
with specific problems by the hill community and the state 
or by the media and academia, which was dominated by hill 
people   during the 1990-02 democratic years.  This non-
recognition of the Madhesi was so widespread that even the 
1998 and 2004 
Nepal Human 
Development 
Reports 
(NESAC 1998; 
UNDP 2004) 
and Unequal 
Citizens 
(2006) which 
analyzed inter-
group issues 
(published 
respectively by 
the UNDP and a consortium of the World Bank and DFID) 
did not treat the Madhesi as a separate group (Lawoti 2008). 
The fallout of the non-recognition, in addition to symbolic 
and material harm, was the absence of policies that redressed 
the grievances of the Madhesis.  For instance, development 
committees were established for the Dalit and indigenous 
nationalities during the late nineties and they were later 
transformed into the Dalit Commission and an academy for 
the indigenous nationalities.  For women, a separate ministry 
was formed and quotas were set aside in the Upper House 
and local governments.  Similar policies were not formulated 
for the Madhesi.    
The non-recognition is more surprising because the 
Madhesi were the most mobilized among the marginalized 
groups.  Unlike the indigenous nationalities, they launched 
a movement against the imposition of Khas-Nepali as the 
only language of instruction in public schools in the Tarai 
during the 1950s.  A Madhesi political party, the Nepal 
Tarai Congress, received 2.1 percent of the popular vote 
in the 1959 election whereas the parties of the indigenous 
nationalities collectively did not get comparable popular 
votes even in 2008.  The Madhesi began organizing during 
the Panchayat period as the Nepal Sadhvawana Parishad 
(Nepal Goodwill Council), which transformed into a political 
party after 1990.  The party elected Parliamentarians during 
all the three elections in the 1990s whereas the indigenous 
nationalities and the Dalit parties did not elect a single 
member to the Parliament during the period.  A higher level 
of mobilization of the Madhesi would suggest that the state 
and society would be responsive toward them.  However, this 
was not so, because the hill nationalism was so strong that 
the hill society refused to recognize the Madhesi as equal 
Nepalis as long as they could afford do to so, that is until 
the 2007 Madhesi movement that paralyzed the country 
through strikes.  
Specifically, the exclusion of the Madhesi occurred in 
four ways.  First, people without citizenship certificates were 
not eligible to stand for public positions.  Second, attitudes 
of suspicion toward the Madhesi meant that political leaders 
rarely appointed Madhesi to top public positions.  Gaige 
(1975) noted that the Nepali state would only appoint Madhesi 
officials even in the Tarai if they could not find hill people 
for such positions. 
Likewise, due to 
the suspicion of 
Madhesi loyalty 
to the state 
and prejudiced 
perception 
that they are 
cowards, 
they were not 
recruited to the 
security forces, 
not only the 
army but to the police forces as well.  Third, the suspicion 
and prejudice often created awkward and discomforting 
situations for the Madhesi and some left the mainstream 
political parties after it became unbearable.  This reduced 
the pool of Madhesi that could rise within major political 
parties.  Fourth, lack of access to social and state resources 
and socio-cultural discrimination rendered the Madhesi less 
competitive politically.
The lack of recognition and discrimination interacted 
in two ways with formal institutions.  Non-recognition of 
the Madhesi as equal citizens by the hill people competed 
with formal equal rights guarantees to citizens by the 
Constitution while discriminatory attitudes and behavior 
of hill administrators complemented formal discriminatory 
citizenship laws to deny or delay citizenship certificates to 
Group/Status Less Access Greater Access
‘High’ Caste Hindus Madhesi/Tarai Hill
Indigenous Nationalities Madhesi/Tarai Hill
Dalit Madhesi/Tarai Hill
Source: Mohsin et al. (2003)
Table 2: Access to the state by Madhesi/Tarai and Hill People
29 HIMALAYA  XXVIII (1-2) 2008 iNFormAl iNStitutioNS / lAWoti
a large number of Madhesi, which led to their socio-political 
exclusion.      
informal institutions and inclusion     
Some informal institutions in Nepal contributed to 
inclusion, even though indirectly.  For instance, the informal 
norms of the indigenous nationalities operated to compete 
with the formal institutions of the state and informal values 
of the dominant group.  The indigenous nationalities did not 
completely adopt the values, norms and policies of the CHHEM 
centric state that discriminated against them even though 
they were influenced by the dominant group norms to some 
extent, as demonstrated by Hinduization and Nepalization. 
Customary tradition of ethnic/national groups that sustained 
their identity and contributed to their mobilization and 
empowerment is a substitutive informal institution.21  The 
mobilization of marginalized groups, which was facilitated 
by a distinct identity, forced some concessions from the state 
and contributed to the project of socio-cultural mobilization 
for inclusion after 1990.  The practice of customary religious 
traditions (e.g. Kirati, animist) despite their non-recognition 
by the state is an example of competing informal institutions 
that produce divergent outcomes to facilitate inclusion.  
The emergence of the Kirati religion as a census category 
is an example of how formal and informal institutions of 
different groups interact in different ways to produce changes 
in formal and informal institutions.  As the ruling Hindus 
considered Kiratis part of their religion, it was not listed as 
a separate category in the census until 1991.  This was a 
case of formal and informal institutions of Hindus denying 
recognition to a minority religion.  However, in the 1991 
census after the polity was opened, 1.7 percent of people 
asserted Kirati as their religion in the ‘other’ category.  The 
census bureau was forced to include Kirati as a religious 
category in the 2001 census when 3.6 percent said that they 
follow it.
Thus, informal institutions produced both positive 
(identity preservation, mobilization and some concessions to 
marginalized groups) and negative (untouchability despite it 
being declared illegal) outcomes.  This paper, however, has 
amply demonstrated that the informal institutions largely 
contributed in the pervasive exclusion of various groups in 
Nepal during the 1990-2002 democratic years.  
conclUSion
This article demonstrates that informal institutions 
interacted with formal institutions in various ways to 
contribute significantly to the political exclusion in Nepal. 
21. The accommodative informal institution category was not helpful 
in describing and explaining the role of informal institutions in political 
exclusion/inclusion in Nepal.  If effective formal institutions exist, then it 
may not be possible for informal institutions to produce divergent outcomes. 
Thus, this study finds Lauth’s (2000) three-fold category more useful than 
Helmke and Levitsky’s (2004; 2006) four-fold category.
The Nepali case also sheds light on how informal institutions 
contribute in creating new formal institutions or reforming 
them and how they reproduce and get entrenched with the 
help of formal institutions.  For instance, the 1854 civil code 
was introduced, among other reasons, to collate existing caste 
practices in Kathmandu and in other areas of the country 
and to systemize them according to the ruling elite values. 
However, after the civil code was adopted and implemented, 
the caste system spread around the country and became 
more entrenched and began to operate in societies previously 
not influenced by it.  The system was so ingrained that even 
after the caste based laws were formally ended in the 1960s, 
its influence continues through informal mechanisms.
The aim of this paper is not to argue that all the problem 
of political participation in Nepal are due to informal 
institutions.  Poverty and other socio-cultural factors play a 
part in the political exclusion of  social and ethnic groups. 
However, informal institutions such as patriarchy, caste based 
laws, cultural domination, and non-recognition significantly 
contributed to the poverty of the marginalized groups, and 
poverty in turn undermines their ability to mobilize for 
their rights, challenge inequalities, and compete with the 
dominant groups, demonstrating a circular causation.  
The marginalized groups also engage in discriminatory 
practices and norms.  For example, inter group inequality 
and discrimination is more severe in the Tarai between 
caste Hindus and the Dalit.  Practice of untouchability 
exists among the Dalit themselves.  Likewise, indigenous 
nationalities also discriminate against each other and 
towards the Dalit.  Women in all groups face discrimination, 
although to varying degrees.  Caste, ethnicity, religion, class 
and age, on the other hand, often put women in positions 
of conflict with each other.  However, intra and inter group 
discrimination was often the result of the internalization 
(through socialization) as well as the imposition of a 
hierarchical caste system, exclusionary hill nationalism and 
patriarchy, often structured along the values and interests 
of the  hill elite.  The legal, social and structural framework 
constrains marginalized groups from engaging in overt 
challenges and contributes to their internalization of the 
norms.  Once the norms and values are internalized by even 
the oppressed groups, they increase the effectiveness of the 
informal institutions.
Nepal is undergoing a major transformation and it has 
changed some formal institutions and may change many 
others as the country adopts a new Constitution.  Informal 
institutions, however, take time to change.  Attitudes and 
traditions persist and are difficult to change overnight or 
even over time.  Thus, some forms of exclusion, produced 
and reproduced by informal institutions, will probably 
continue even in the ‘new Nepal.’  One way to lower exclusion 
in the future would be to recognize the role of informal 
institutions in exclusion and then devise formal institutions 
that undermine them.  
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